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1 INTRODUCTION
In its now two-decade-long transition from a centrally planned to a mar-
ket economy, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has made remarkable
progress in introducing competition to its industries. It recognized that it
was essential to build an effective competition policy system so as to cre-
ate a level playing field for all business enterprises. During this transi-
tional period, industrial policies and inward foreign direct investment
(FDI) played a crucial role both in transforming industry and in facilitat-
ing the development of competition policy. This chapter reviews the com-
petition policy framework in the PRC with emphasis on its interactions
with industrial and FDI policies.
I review existing competition law in the PRC in section 2, focusing in
particular on the 1993 Anti Unfair Competition Law, which deals with
unfair methods of competition as well as restrictive behavior on the part
of public utilities and administrative monopolies, and the 1998 Price Law,
which prohibits price fixing, price discrimination, and predatory pricing.
I also review the draft antimonopoly law, which has gone through many
revisions since the early 1990s and which is likely to be legislated soon.
Section 2 also provides information on law enforcement together with
detailed cases studies illustrating the current status of competition law
enforcement, and public awareness, in the PRC.
Since the start of economic reform and the introduction of an open
door policy in 1978, the PRC has vigorously promoted industrial policies.
The government strongly believed that, by guiding resource allocation
with a ‘visible hand,’ it could establish industries that were capable of
4
People’s Republic of China
Ping Lin
73
Comp13  17/5/05  2:46 PM  Page 73
competing in international markets while at the same time avoiding the
fluctuations that accompany the free play of market forces. During the
1990s, the PRC actively pursued a strategy of building up giant conglom-
erates and national champions, following the example of the Republic of
Korea (Korea). Although the Asian financial crisis led the government to
reconsider this strategy, industrial policies remain the guiding force in
many economic policies. Section 3 of this chapter examines the interac-
tions between industrial policies and competition policy in the PRC.
Local protectionism is another major obstacle to competition policy
development in the PRC. For historical reasons, local governments have
had a strong incentive to protect local enterprises from competition from
other regions. This has contributed to the duplication of investments and
to excess capacity in some industries, and thus the PRC’s observed low
degree of industrial concentration. Section 4 focuses on the role of
regional protectionism in attracting FDI. It gives an example of a car tar-
iff war between Shanghai city and Hubei province to illustrate the preva-
lence of regional protectionism and its effects on competition and FDI
allocation. 
Section 5 examines the effects of inward FDI on competition, in par-
ticular through two contrasting case studies of acquisitions of domestic
brands by multinational enterprises (MNEs). Whereas Unilever and Proc-
ter & Gamble have reportedly adopted a ‘brand-killing’ strategy in rela-
tion to the brands they acquired from their local joint venture partners,
L’Oréal appears to be committed to the two leading skincare brands it
acquired in late 2003 and early 2004. This section also discusses the coun-
try’s first merger and acquisition (M&A) notification system, set up in
2003 in response to the increase in FDI-related M&As. 
In sections 6 and 7 of the chapter I provide some observations on com-
petition and poverty reduction, and offer some concluding remarks.
2 COMPETITION LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA
The PRC did not have a competition policy until the late 1970s when it
started the transition process from a centrally planned to a market econ-
omy. Under the traditional central planning system, competition had no
role to play either in theory or in practice, and therefore there was no need
whatsoever for a competition policy.
In the early 1980s, the PRC moved toward a more decentralized econ-
omy. The government permitted the development of a private sector and
introduced competition into economic life. There was then a need to set
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up rules to govern competition. Currently the main competition laws and
regulations in the PRC are the 1980 Provisional Regulations Concerning
Development and Protection of the Socialist Competition Mechanism, the
1993 Anti Unfair Competition Law, and the 1998 Price Law. The PRC
began drafting a comprehensive antimonopoly law in the early 1990s, but
this has not yet been legislated. 
The objective of competition policy in the PRC is described in article 1
of the 1993 Anti Unfair Competition Law as being to 
safeguard healthy development of the socialist market economy, encourage
and protect fair competition, stop acts of unfair competition and to defend the
lawful rights and interests of operators and consumers.
The 1980 regulations 
The first government document related to competition in the PRC—the
Provisional Regulations Concerning Development and Protection of the
Socialist Competition Mechanism—was issued by the State Council on 17
October 1980. It stipulates that 
in economic activities, with the exception of products managed exclusively by
state-designated departments and organizations, monopolization or sole pro-
prietary management of other products is not allowed (article 3).
The contents of the regulations are brief and the regulations were
never properly enforced. Nevertheless, even at this early stage of compe-
tition policy development, it is apparent that the State Council recognized
the need to curb administrative monopolies and regional protectionism.
Article 6 states that
competition must be introduced by breaking down regional blockades and
departmental barriers. No locality or department is allowed to block the mar-
ket. No locality or department should impose any ban on the entry of goods
made in other places. Localities should ensure that raw material can be trans-
ferred out according to state plans and must not create any blockade. Depart-
ments in charge of industry, transport, finance and trade must revise any part
or parts of their existing regulations and systems which impede competition so
as to facilitate competition.
The 1993 Anti Unfair Competition Law
The 1993 Anti Unfair Competition Law, which took effect on 1 Decem-
ber 1993, was the PRC’s first competition law.1 Its goals were to protect
competition and prevent unfair trade practices. The promulgation and
implementation of this law represented a significant step toward the estab-
lishment of a competition policy in the PRC.
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The law proscribed trademark counterfeiting (article 5); restrictions on
the use of related products imposed by public enterprises and other legal
monopolies (article 6); abuse of administrative power or restraints on free
trade among regions by government agencies or their associates (article
7); bribery in business transactions (article 8); deceptive advertising (arti-
cle 9); obtaining, disclosing, or using trade secrets without the consent of
the owner (article 10); predatory pricing (article 11); tied sales (article 12);
deceptive sales tactics such as prize draws (article 13); uttering and dis-
seminating false information that would hurt the reputation of a competi-
tor (article 14); and bid rigging (article 15). The prohibited acts can be
classified into the following three categories. 
1 Deceptive advertising and other business activities involving dishon-
esty (articles 8, 9, 13, and 14). Article 8 prohibits bribery in business
transactions, especially in the form of kickbacks whereby buyers of
commodities are rewarded, in money or materials, in transactions that
do not appear in the company books. Article 9 prohibits false or mis-
leading advertising. It extends the liability for false advertising to
advertising agencies that are or should be aware of a seller’s misrepre-
sentation. Article 13 limits the use of prize draws as a marketing strat-
egy. To be legal, a draw must be conducted honestly and the value of
the prize must not exceed CNY5,000. Article 14 outlaws the utterance
and dissemination of information intended to injure the reputation of a
competitor. 
2 Protection of intellectual property rights and trade secrets (articles 5
and 10). Article 5 offers protection against trademark infringement. It
prohibits not only the forgery of trademarks and certificates of quality
and origin, but also the use of similar brand identification—brand
names, packaging, or designs—that would be likely to confuse the
consumer. A fine of 100–300 percent of the value of the illegal gains
may be imposed for breaches of the law. Criminal sanctions may also
be imposed in accordance with the PRC Trademark Law. Article 10
protects trade secrets, defined as technical and operational information
that is not known to the public, that is capable of bringing economic
benefits to the owners of the rights, that has practical applicability, and
that the owners of the rights have taken measures to keep secret. The
law imposes a fine of CNY10,000–200,000 on those who obtain such
secrets illegally, or who know or should know that a trade secret was
obtained illegally but nevertheless agree to distribute such knowledge
to a third party.
3 Antitrust provisions (articles 6, 7, 11, 12, and 15). Five of the 11 acts
prohibited by the Anti Unfair Competition Law can be classified as
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antitrust provisions. Article 6 states that ‘Public utility enterprises or
other business operators that have a legal monopolistic status shall not
force others to buy the goods or services of their designated business
operators in order to exclude other operators from competing fairly.’
Violations may incur fines of CNY50,000–200,000, as well as confis-
cation of 100–300 percent of the illegally acquired revenue (article
23).
Article 7 addresses the behavior of government officials who
coerce customers into buying products from their designated suppliers,
stating that ‘A local government and its subordinate departments shall
not abuse their administrative power to force others to buy the goods
of the operators designated by them so as to restrict the lawful busi-
ness activities of other operators.’ It also prohibits blockades of
regional competition: ‘A local government and its subordinate depart-
ments shall not abuse their administrative power to restrict the entry of
goods from other parts of the country into the local market or the flow
of local goods to markets in other parts of the country.’
Article 11 prohibits predatory pricing. It prevents operators from
selling products at below cost in order to drive out competitors—while
not spelling out what ‘cost’ actually means. Article 11 excepts a num-
ber of practices from its provisions: the sale of fresh produce; the dis-
posal of products whose period of validity is about to expire, or of
overstocked products; seasonal reductions in prices; and the sale of
products at reduced prices to pay off a debt, or due to a change in prod-
uct lines or the closure of the business. 
Article 12 provides that, in selling a product, a business operator
shall not make a tied sale against the wishes of the buyer, or attach any
other unreasonable conditions. 
Article 15 prohibits collusion in the tendering process (bid rig-
ging).2 Violators can be fined CNY10,000–200,000 depending on the
seriousness of the offense (article 27). 
The 1993 Anti Unfair Competition Law provides for criminal penal-
ties only in the cases of trademark infringement (article 21) and bribery
(article 22). Even the hard-core collusive behavior of bid rigging does not
attract a criminal penalty under the 1993 law, although it does under the
Public Tendering Law of the People’s Republic of China, which took
effect in January 2000.
The State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) is the
administrative body responsible for enforcing the 1993 Anti Unfair Com-
petition Law.3 It has branches throughout the country at the provincial,
city, and county levels, and had over 61,000 staff nationwide in 2002. All
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SAIC branches have investigative power. They can issue warnings and
take corrective measures, including imposing fines and suspending busi-
ness licenses. 
SAIC is under the State Council and has a long tradition of protecting
market order even under the traditional central planning system. The Fair
Trade Bureau created within SAIC in 1994 has three divisions, responsi-
ble for preventing unfair trade practices, investigating monopolies, and
consumer protection. SAIC’s other duties include administration of busi-
ness licenses, registration of trademarks, and enforcement of related laws
such as the Trademark Law and the Advertising Law. 
Table 4.1 contains information on SAIC’s enforcement activities dur-
ing 1995–2002. Although the majority of the cases listed in the table
involve trademark infringements or trade secrets, SAIC has also been
active in combating antitrust violations. In 1995 SAIC handled 194
antitrust cases. The figure has continued to rise since then, reaching as
high as 2,208 in 2001 and 1,547 in 2002. A large number of these cases
involved public utilities, with bid rigging constituting another main com-
ponent. The sharp rise in the number of such cases in recent years reflects
the increased attention SAIC has paid to fighting the abuse of administra-
tive power and restrictive practices by public utilities. In 2001, it launched
a nationwide campaign specifically to counter such practices. In 2002, the
State Council launched its own campaign to break down sectoral monop-
olies and regional blockades, and combat other anticompetitive acts
(Wang 2001). As a consequence, the number of administrative monopoly
cases rose substantially in 2000 and reached a record high of 137 cases in
2001. The number of cases involving public utilities increased from 432
in 1999 to 785 in 2000, then more than doubled to 1,614 in 2001 before
declining to 1,089 in 2002. Other types of antitrust violations have expe-
rienced a similar pattern, except for predatory pricing, which accounts for
30–40 cases per year.4
During the decade since the introduction of the 1993 Anti Unfair Com-
petition Law, SAIC has issued over 70 administrative explanations to
local SAIC branches giving specific guidance on law enforcement. In the
area of international cooperation, it has established cooperative relation-
ships with over 20 competition agencies from other countries (Gan 2003).
In addition, it has conducted various competition advocacy activities to
raise public awareness of competition policy. The State Council promoted
SAIC from vice-ministerial to ministerial level in 2001, further strength-
ening its authority and position. 
While the enforcement record of SAIC is impressive, one point worth
noting is that most of the cases it has dealt with have involved administra-
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tive measures, with only a tiny percentage turned over to the judicial sys-
tem. This indicates the heavy reliance of competition law enforcement on
administrative channels.5
In addition to the national Anti Unfair Competition Law, many
provinces and major cities have their own laws and regulations designed
to counter unfair competition.6 For example, price fixing was first prohib-
ited by Guangdong province under implementing regulations on unfair
competition. Beijing enacted an Anti Unfair Competition Law in 1994,
shortly after the promulgation of the national law. To date, over 20
provinces and cities in the PRC have enacted similar laws and regulations,
some of them simply detailed guidelines for implementing the national
law (Kong 2001: 15). Sectoral regulations such as the 2000 Telecommu-
nications Ordinance of the People’s Republic of China also incorporate
competition-related provisions. 
The 1998 Price Law
Five years after the promulgation of the Anti Unfair Competition Law, the
government enacted another important piece of competition legislation,
the 1998 Price Law. The main objective of this law, which came into effect
on 1 May 1998, is to fight price fixing and predatory pricing. Article 14
declares the following practices to be unfair and illegal: conspiracies
aimed at controlling market prices that result in damage to other operators
and/or consumers; predatory pricing; and price discrimination.7 The
penalty for violating the provisions of the 1998 Price Law can be as high
as five times the illegal gains. In extremely serious cases, business
licenses can be suspended. However, no criminal penalties can be
imposed.
The Price Law is a good complement to the Anti Unfair Competition
Law in that it specifically outlaws price cartels, which the 1993 law did
not do. It also makes up for the failure of the 1993 law to provide a defi-
nition for ‘cost’ in its predatory pricing provisions: the Price Law defines
‘cost’ as referring to production and operational costs (article 8). A provi-
sion on discrimination against particular business operations is designed
to prevent monopolies from using a price squeeze strategy to drive com-
petitors out of related markets. The 1993 law contains similar provisions
on discrimination against particular business operations.8
Responsibility for enforcing the Price Law rests with the State Devel-
opment and Reform Commission (SDRC) and its price administration
agencies at the provincial, city, and county levels. This enforcement sys-
tem was very inexpensive to set up as the SDRC and its local branches
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were already in place; it was this body that had been responsible for set-
ting the prices of virtually all commodities during the central planning
era.9 Although detailed data on the SDRC’s law enforcement record are
not available, it is clear that it has not been as busy as SAIC, partly due to
the differences in the nature of the violations covered by the two laws. The
SDRC has, however, been tested by some price-fixing cases that have
drawn national attention, such as a cartel in color television sets (Box 4.1).
Enforcement activity by local SDRC branches has also been reported. For
example, in July 2000 the Beijing Price Bureau successfully broke an
agreement among nine licensed travel agencies in Beijing to collectively
set minimum prices on package trips to several Southeast Asian destina-
tions.10
An important lesson that can be drawn from the case of the color tel-
evision cartel is that the government needs to do more to raise public
awareness of the Price Law. The TV manufacturers involved in the price
cartel initially did not realize that their agreement was illegal, and even a
high-ranking official in the Ministry of Information Industry was not
aware that they had violated the Price Law. Other firms have been simi-
larly caught out.11 Better competition advocacy would certainly improve
the effectiveness of competition law in the PRC. 
Moreover, the occurrence of price wars and subsequent closure of
some firms does not necessarily mean that competition is excessive or
vicious. On the contrary, it may be an indication of a market system that
is functioning well and of improvements in efficiency as less-efficient
players are driven out of the market. One does of course also need to be
aware of the danger of predatory behavior. But in any case, it should be
the law, rather than self-regulation on the part of the players, that deals
with any instances of anticompetitive conduct. 
The draft antimonopoly law
The PRC’s existing competition laws focus primarily on unfair competi-
tion. They do not deal with monopolization, abuse of a dominant position,
or M&As. In 1994, the government announced its intention to promulgate
an antimonopoly law to supplement the provisions of the Anti Unfair
Competition Law. The drafting group formed in May 1994 consisted of
officials from the State Economic and Trade Commission and SAIC. The
antimonopoly law they prepared has been revised several times, based on
the suggestions of scholars from international organizations such as the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the
World Bank, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
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and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and from countries such as Ger-
many, the United States, Japan, Korea, and Australia. 
The most recent version of the law that is publicly accessible was
drafted in 2002. It has eight chapters containing 58 articles. The chapters
cover price fixing, predatory pricing, price discrimination, refusal to deal,
tied sales, exclusive dealing, resale price maintenance, M&As, adminis-
trative monopolies, the establishment of a competition authority, legal lia-
bility, and so on, accompanied by both civil and criminal remedies. (A
detailed table of contents for the draft law is given in Appendix A4.1.) The
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Box 4.1  A case study of a color television cartel
The television industry underwent six price wars during the period 1996–
2000, with several leading manufacturers experiencing losses in 2000 (Lee
and Chan 2002). On 9 June 2000, at a summit held in Shenzhen, the top
managers of nine TV manufacturers agreed to form an alliance to address
the problems in the industry. 
The nine manufacturers who took part in the summit were Konka, Sky-
worth, TCL, Rova, Hisense, Xoceco, Jinxing, Panda, and Westlake, who
together account for more than 80 percent of the domestic color TV mar-
ket. The PRC’s leading manufacturer, Changhong, did not participate. The
agreement reached at the summit covered three areas: research and devel-
opment (R&D) cooperation in developing new products and a digital tech-
nology standard for the industry; joint efforts to promote exports to other
countries; and the setting of minimum prices for TVs sold domestically. 
The third element is clearly a price cartel agreement. The manufactur-
ers jointly announced that the retail prices of 21-inch, 25-inch, 29-inch, and
34-inch color television sets would henceforth be at least CNY1,050 ($127
at the current official rate of CNY8.27/$1), CNY1,700 ($206), CNY2,600
($310), and CNY4,200 ($500) respectively. Beijing Youth Daily reported
that the alliance also planned to cut production for the domestic market by
15–20 percent. This would amount to a reduction of about two million tel-
evision sets (China Daily, 25 June 2000, 11 August 2000). According to the
manufacturers, the prescribed minimum was so low that any TV sold at a
lower price would have to be of very poor quality.
It appears that the TV manufacturers were not aware that their collec-
tive action would violate the 1998 Price Law. The managers of some of the
companies openly defended their decision, saying that collective action
was needed to end the losses caused by the price wars in the industry. The
State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC)—which is now the
SDRC—had to make it publicly clear that their acts were indeed a breach
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latest draft of the antimonopoly law was submitted to the State Council’s
Legislative Affairs Office in March 2004 and has been placed on the leg-
islative agenda of the current National People’s Congress (which ends in
2007). 
The coverage of the draft law is quite comprehensive and generally in
line with international standards.15 However, one major area, namely the
provisions on legal liability, has aroused debate. Chapter 7 of the draft law
spells out the maximum penalties for violations of the law: CNY5 million
for price fixing, CNY10 million for abuse of a dominant market position
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of the law. An SDPC official criticized the alliance as a monopoly in dis-
guised form, and said that the SDPC would investigate the case inten-
sively.12 But Konka for one fought back, saying that the price floor set by
the alliance was sufficient only to cover production costs. The company’s
executive vice-president, Liang Rong, pointed out that the cost of producing
a television set included such things as materials, labor, overheads, taxes,
after-sales services, and employee training fees, as well as the company’s
spending on R&D. ‘Sales under the floor price, or production costs, should
be regarded as unfair competition,’ he said (China Daily, 25 June 2000).
A high-ranking official in the Ministry of Information Industry, which
supervises the sector, seemed to take the industry’s side; on the same day
that the summit was held, he stated that the formation of such an alliance
was a sign of the maturing of the color TV sector, indicating the ‘healthy
development of the industry via self-protection, self-discipline, and volun-
tary cooperation.’13 But on 3 August 2000, after meeting with the nine pro-
ducers, the SDPC and the Ministry of Information Industry jointly declared
that while there was nothing wrong with the manufacturers discussing long-
term issues affecting the industry as a whole, setting minimum prices never-
theless violated the 1998 Price Law.14
No formal action has been taken against the manufacturers, perhaps
because of the internal problems that quickly developed within the alliance.
Only a day after its establishment, the Nanjing-based company, Panda,
reportedly priced one of its models at CNY600 ($72.30), lower than the
floor price set by the alliance. According to An and Yang (2002), the alliance
had agreed to impose a fine of CNY500,000 on any manufacturer that vio-
lated the agreement, but this rule was never implemented. Supermarket sta-
tistics also indicate the failure of the agreement: there was an actual increase
in the number of color TV sets sold after the alliance declared it would limit
production and raise prices (China Daily, 25 June 2000). 
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and for non-compliance with merger control decisions, and so on. How-
ever, it fails to specify the basis for imposing a specific penalty for any
given violation. Is the penalty supposed to be equal to the illegal gains?
Can multiple damages be imposed? Economic principles tell us that for
laws to have a deterrent effect, the penalty needs to be greater than the ille-
gal gains from the violation (because the probability of detecting a viola-
tion is less than 1).16 Unlike the 1993 Anti Unfair Competition Law and
1998 Price Law, which both allow multiple damages and thus are consis-
tent with the economic principles for an optimal penalty, the draft anti-
monopoly law has yet to explicitly incorporate the notion of a deterrent
effect.17
A distinct feature of the PRC’s draft antimonopoly law is that it deals
explicitly with administrative monopolies. Chapter 5 identifies four types
of administrative monopoly: forced transactions, regional blockades, sec-
tor/industry monopolies, and forced joint activities that restrict competi-
tion. Administrative monopolies are rooted in the traditional central
planning system and will continue to be extremely difficult to tackle. 
The two types of administrative monopoly that are most prevalent in
the PRC are regional blockades (discussed in more detail in section 4) and
sectoral monopolies. One illustration of the latter is found in the telecom-
munications industry as documented by Sheng and Zhang (2000).
Telecommunications services were provided by one giant monopoly, the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, until the early 1990s. In 1994,
China Unicom, a new service provider jointly established by the Ministry
of Electronics, Ministry of Electricity, and Ministry of Railroads, entered
the telecommunications markets with the authorization of the State Coun-
cil. The industry thus became a duopoly between China Unicom and the
dominant incumbent, which was also the industry regulator. 
According to Sheng and Zhang (2000), the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications adopted several anticompetitive practices shortly
after the entry of China Unicom in order to defend its monopoly position.
The new entrant was required to apply to the ministry for permission to
operate in any of the PRC’s many geographic markets. By delaying con-
sideration of its applications, the ministry could ensure that China Uni-
com’s newly developed infrastructure could not be put to use for some
time. The ministry also set up administrative barriers, and charged unrea-
sonable interconnection rates for access to its network. It made it difficult
for the new entrant to obtain critical resources such as telephone numbers,
airwave frequencies, and satellite channels, occasionally disconnected
services to China Unicom’s customers, and employed other restrictive
business practices such as predatory pricing and cross-subsidization.
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3 LINKAGES BETWEEN COMPETITION POLICY AND
INDUSTRIAL POLICY
Since the start of its open door policy in the late 1970s, the PRC has per-
sistently pursued targeted industrial policies. Industrial policy objectives
are embedded in the country’s FDI, science and technology, education,
land use, and taxation policies. According to Jiang (2002a: 49), the cen-
tral government issued more than 80 comprehensive industrial policies
between 1978 and 1997, pertaining to virtually every government depart-
ment and every industry. She divided these industrial policies into four
categories: policies designed to reform the industrial landscape; those
containing interventionist measures; policies that supported particular
industries and enterprises; and those that restricted certain industries and
enterprises.18
Jiang (2002a) identified three stages of policy development. 19 During
the first stage, from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, the PRC’s industrial
policies promoted competition, by encouraging the entry of new firms
(particularly in non-state sectors), by introducing competition among
existing enterprises, and by relaxing price controls. In the second stage,
from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the country’s industrial policies
limited competition. They restrained the establishment of new small and
medium-sized enterprises, restricted competition between rural and state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), and provided preferential treatment to large
SOEs. In the third stage, which began in the mid-1990s, industrial policies
have both promoted and limited competition: they have been used to pro-
mote competition in monopolistic industries, but they have also been used
to rescue SOEs that were facing difficulties.
Jiang’s characterizations of the effects of industrial policies on compe-
tition are fairly sensible. Until the mid-1990s, the PRC’s policy-makers
regarded industrial policies as the cure for virtually every economic prob-
lem and as the key to long-term economic development. Whenever a
shortage or surplus occurred in the marketplace, or competition was
judged to be ‘excessive’ (as seen by price wars or a large number of loss-
making enterprises), the public expected the government to step in and
correct the situation with ‘proper’ industrial policies. 
During the early stage of economic reform (late 1970s to mid-1980s),
a primary goal of the government was to improve the performance of
enterprises by introducing competition—relaxing price controls, remov-
ing entry barriers, and so on. On the whole these measures worked well,
significantly boosting enterprise performance. However, during that
period—and indeed until the mid-1990s—the market mechanism was
regarded as supplementary to central planning. As competition intensified
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in the domestic industry, the government was faced with new problems
such as the duplication of investments and the crowding out of large SOEs
by small-scale, mostly non-state-owned, new entrants. To combat these
‘problems,’ the government introduced new industrial policies. The sec-
ond stage in Jiang’s analysis thus corresponds roughly to a correction
period for industry. After a period of consolidation, during which order
was restored and industrial activity slowed, a new round of stimulatory
industrial policies was launched. 
In October 1992, at the 14th Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party, the PRC decided to replace its traditional approach in which the
market was supplementary to central planning with one aimed at estab-
lishing a socialist market economy. Gradually the market mechanism has
been recognized as an alternative, and possibly much better, means to
overcome economic problems. Nowadays, the most competitive indus-
tries in the PRC, such as home appliances and textiles, are those that expe-
rienced the most turmoil and excessive competition during the past two
decades. 
Nevertheless, industrial policies continue to play a very important
role. In particular, the promotion of large-scale enterprises remains an
important part of central government policy. Influenced by the approach
of Korea, the PRC regarded the establishment of large conglomerates as
the best way for domestic enterprises to obtain economies of scale and
compete with MNEs both domestically and in international markets. It
also saw M&As as an effective vehicle to absorb and transform loss-
making SOEs.20 In 1991 and again in 1997, the State Council selected a
‘national team’ of 120 large enterprise groups, primarily from industries
considered to be of strategic importance, to receive special treatment from
the government.21 To enhance their competitiveness, these ‘national
champions’ were granted tariff protection, special rights to engage in
international trade, access to foreign technology, ‘easy loans’ from state-
owned banks, and other preferential treatment.22
Although the Asian financial crisis, and its effects on Korea in partic-
ular, led the PRC to reconsider its original approach, establishing large
domestic enterprises has remained a top priority for the government. Not
surprisingly, many of the large-scale M&As that have taken place in
recent years have been government managed. For example, in a govern-
ment-ordered merger in 2002, the Civil Aviation Administration of China
forced nine domestic airlines under its direct control to form three super
groups: China National Aviation and China Southwest became sub-
sidiaries of Air China; Yunnan Airlines and China Northwest became sub-
sidiaries of China Eastern; and China Northern and Xinjiang Airlines
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became subsidiaries of China Southern. Because the mergers were carried
out through administrative transfers, the super groups obtained the assets
of the regional carriers for free. 
In another example, under its 10th five-year plan for the auto industry
(2000–05), the government decided to encourage 100 small automobile
manufacturers to merge with the three giants: First Automotive Works
Corporation, Dongfeng Automobile Company, and Shanghai Automobile
Group. In 2002, First Automotive Works bought a majority stake in Tian-
jin Xiali Ltd in the largest M&A transaction in domestic auto-manufactur-
ing history. This acquisition was more market oriented than the airline
transactions in that First Automotive Works actually purchased 51 percent
of Tianjin Xiali’s stock (Global M&A Research Center 2003: 393–7).
Industrial policy and the delay in enacting antimonopoly legislation
As mentioned earlier, the PRC began drafting an antimonopoly law in the
early 1990s. While there are many reasons for the long delay in enacting
this legislation, the pursuit of industrial policy has been one factor hold-
ing back the effort to set up a comprehensive competition law. 
Views on the need to introduce an antimonopoly law in the PRC dif-
fer. One view holds that it is too early to enact such a law because the PRC
is still in the early stage of building a market system and its markets are
not well developed. The issue for most industries in the PRC is not high
concentration, but rather the reverse: major firms have not yet attained
economies of scale, and so action against monopolies is largely irrelevant
(Yang 2002). A related position held by many government officials is that
the government should actually continue to encourage the formation and
development of large enterprise groups and promote economies of scale
so as to enhance the international competitiveness of domestic enterprises.
The introduction of an antimonopoly law would work against these goals
(Li and Ma 2002). Both of these views seem to equate competition policy
with a bias against bigness. 
Advocates of antimonopoly legislation, meanwhile, hold that the
enactment of an antimonopoly law is not only consistent with, but also
necessary for, enhancing the competitiveness of large enterprises, espe-
cially SOEs. According to this view, only through fair market competition
where efficient firms survive and prosper and inefficient ones exit the
marketplace can large domestic enterprises really grow and become com-
petitive (Wang 2004; Kong 2001: 259). The proponents of this view
believe that creating and maintaining a level playing field, as opposed to
protecting domestic enterprises, benefits all firms. 
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A more pessimistic view holds that the most crucial issue facing the
PRC today is the fight against administrative monopolies, a problem that
will not be resolved by a single piece of antimonopoly legislation. The
proponents of this view maintain that the administrative monopolies
inherited from the traditional central planning system can only be dealt
with through further economic reform and the PRC’s transformation into
a true market economy (Li and Ma 2002).
Promulgating an antimonopoly law is now at the top of the agenda for
the National People’s Congress. However, even with such a law in place,
conflicts between competition policy and industrial policy are likely to
occur. For example, in evaluating the competition effects of a merger, the
government is likely to take into account its desire to encourage large
enterprise groups and promote national champions. Also, in situations
involving competition between domestic firms and foreign investors, pro-
tection of domestic players may continue to carry some weight. The chal-
lenge for the competition law enforcement agency will be to demonstrate
that it can deal with such conflicts.23 In the author’s view, it is extremely
important for the PRC to establish a truly independent enforcement agency
with sole responsibility for enforcing competition law. If, instead, the task
of enforcing the antimonopoly law rests on the shoulders of an existing
agency that has traditionally been charged with promoting industrial pol-
icy, then it will be more difficult to guarantee the full implementation of
competition policy and its non-interference with industrial policy. 
4 LOCAL PROTECTIONISM AND COMPETITION
Local protectionism is prevalent in the PRC. It has taken such forms as
imposing taxes on commodities made in other provinces (Box 4.2), ban-
ning exports to other regions of locally made raw materials that are of high
quality or in short supply,24 or even preventing law enforcement officers
from dealing with local firms that counterfeit the brands of other regions
(Lin 2001). With the move toward fiscal decentralization since 1978, local
governments have had a strong incentive to shield local firms and protect
their tax base. The desire to guarantee local employment is another eco-
nomic as well as political incentive for local government officials.
Throughout the 1990s, local governments competed to attract FDI, even
adopting protective measures that would ensure the profitability of locally
based foreign firms. 
Local protectionism leads to market fragmentation and thus to low
regional specialization. The eight-firm concentration ratios reported in
Table 4.2 are consistent with widespread local protectionism in the PRC.
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Box 4.2  A case study of protection in the local auto industry
The city of Shanghai and the province of Hubei are the PRC’s two leading
car manufacturing bases. In 1984 Volkswagen, the German auto manufac-
turer, set up a 50:50 joint venture with a consortium of domestic partners
led by the Shanghai Automotive Industrial Corporation to produce Santana
passenger cars in Shanghai. In 1992, Automobiles Citroën of France and
Dong Feng Motor Corporation of the PRC set up the Dong Feng Citroën
Automobile Company in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei, to produce and sell
Fukang passenger cars. 
In mid-1998, Shanghai introduced local regulations to protect its San-
tana sedans. The municipal government slapped extra licensing fees and
sales taxes on consumers who bought cars made outside Shanghai, thereby
adding some CNY80,000 ($9,600) to the already high prices of such cars.25
This badly affected the Fukang; in the first half of 1999, Dong Feng Cit-
roën sold only 24 cars in Shanghai whereas Shanghai Volkswagen sold
6,400 Santanas.
In swift and severe retaliation, Hubei began levying taxes on con-
sumers who bought Santanas rather than the locally made Fukang. Taxes
included irrigation construction fees (abolished long ago by the central
government) and a dubious CNY70,000 ($8,400) levy to ‘help loss-making
SOEs overcome their difficulties.’ As a result, the price of a Santana in
Wuhan rose to CNY326,000 ($39,000)—nearly double its usual price of
CNY172,000 ($20,700).
Both Shanghai’s and Hubei’s regulations on car purchases came into
being despite a 1990 directive from the State Council banning such restric-
tions on interprovincial trade. A spokesperson for the Machinery Industry
Department of Hubei claimed that the province had been forced to issue the
restrictions because ‘everyone else does the same.’ It is indeed true that,
with more than 120 car-makers nationwide, nearly every locality that
boasts an auto plant applies restrictions to outside manufacturers in order to
keep its own local champion afloat.
Unable to enforce regulations among competing localities, the central
government decided to take the PRC’s three leading car-makers under its
protection and support the creation of a mainland-style auto chaebol. The
chosen three included the two companies at the center of the Shanghai–
Hubei car war—Shanghai Automotive Industrial Corporation and Dong
Feng Motor Corporation—as well as First Automotive Works, which is
based in Jilin province. In late January 2000, Shanghai announced that it
would scrap its protective licensing fees and, from 19 January 2000, throw
open its market to outside manufacturers. 
Source: Asia Times Online, 15 January 2000.
Comp13  17/5/05  2:46 PM  Page 89
Although the degree of concentration has generally increased since 1995,
very few industries have a concentration ratio above 50 percent, and for
most the ratio is below 20 percent.
Recent empirical studies on the effects of local protectionism on
regional economies in the PRC have come up with mixed findings. Young
(2000) provides anecdotal evidence of a rise in local protectionism during
the reform era, especially in the 1980s, and presents statistical evidence of
declining regional specialization. Naughton (1999), on the other hand,
finds evidence of increasing regional specialization between 1987 and
1992. More recently, Bai et al. (2005) use more comprehensive statistical
methods to find evidence of local protection of industries with a high tax-
plus-profit margin and a high degree of state ownership. They also find
that the degree of regional specialization has been increasing since the
mid-1980s, after an earlier decrease. Nevertheless, the case study of the
auto industry presented in Box 4.2 demonstrates that regional protection-
ism was prevalent even in the late 1990s, despite the revised trend.
The central government has long been trying to prohibit regional pro-
tectionism. This was the intention of article 6 of the State Council’s Pro-
visional Regulations Concerning Development and Protection of the
Socialist Competition Mechanism, issued as early as 1980. Enforcement
of these regulations over the past two decades has, however, been poor.
Perhaps the passage of an antimonopoly law, especially the provisions on
administrative monopolies, will allow regional barriers to trade and com-
petition to be torn down more effectively.
Possibly even more important than external forces such as enforce-
ment are internal incentives on the part of localities. In June 2004, nine
provinces in southern PRC joined the Macao and Hong Kong, China spe-
cial administrative regions to form the Pan Pearl River Delta regional
trading block.26 This was an encouraging development given that the sole
goal of the agreement was to break down trade barriers and build a vast
common market for the 11 member regions. The formation of this trading
block was driven by increasingly intense competition between the Pearl
River Delta region (consisting of Guangdong province and the Macao and
Hong Kong, China special administrative regions) and the Yangtze River
Delta (consisting of the city of Shanghai and the provinces of Zhengjiang
and Jiangsu in eastern PRC). 
5 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND COMPETITION 
A major factor affecting the degree of competition in the PRC is the mas-
sive inflow of FDI over the past two decades. Since the PRC adopted an
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Table 4.2 PRC: Eight-firm concentration ratios in selected
manufacturing industries, 1995 and 2000 (%)
Industry 1995 2000
Food processing 5.3 7.5
Food production 9.9 13.1
Beverage production 8.6 20.4
Tobacco processing 33.0 54.0
Textiles 2.8 6.6
Garments & other fiber products 3.8 9.3
Leather, furs, & related products 2.9 n.a.
Timber & straw products 5.7 n.a.
Furniture manufacturing 5.4 n.a.
Papermaking & paper products 5.3 10.9
Printing & recorded medium 
products 5.1 n.a.
Educational & sporting products 8.1 n.a.
Petroleum processing & coking 44.9 82.8
Chemical materials & products 11.3 7.9
Pharmaceutical products 11.8 28.8
Chemical fibers 37.6 13.8
Rubber products 18.3 36.4
Plastic products 3.6 6.0
Non-metal mineral products 2.4 6.1
Ferrous metals 30.2 39.5
Non-ferrous metals 13.3 10.3
Metal products 4.6 9.5
Ordinary machinery 6.5 9.9
Equipment for special purposes 6.2 11.7
Transport equipment 20.9 28.9
Electrical equipment & machinery 8.8 30.8
Electronic & telecommunications 
equipment 14.7 23.1
n.a. = not available.
Source: China Statistics Press (1997, 2002). 
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open door policy in the late 1970s, and particularly since 1993 when Deng
Xiaoping made his famous tour of the south, inward FDI has been a driv-
ing force for increased competition in the PRC. The presence of foreign-
invested companies has greatly changed the landscape of competition for
almost every industry.
Table 4.3 contains information on the presence of foreign firms in var-
ious manufacturing industries. As can be seen, in 2002 foreign-invested
enterprises accounted for over 30 percent of total sales in many industries.
The ratio was over 50 percent in industries such as leather and fur prod-
ucts and cultural and sporting goods, and as high as 74 percent in elec-
tronic and telecommunications equipment. In most industries the foreign
presence has increased since 1995, highlighting the trend toward
increased competition from foreign firms in the domestic market. 
However, entry into the PRC has been far from free for foreign
investors. They are subject to numerous government regulations, includ-
ing the requirement to abide by the central government’s Catalog Guiding
Foreign Investment in Industry (MOFTEC 2003). This catalog divides
industries into those that are ‘prohibited,’ ‘restricted,’ ‘allowed,’ and
‘encouraged’ in terms of their openness to FDI.27 Depending on the
amount of investment, every new project involving foreign investment
must be approved by either the provincial/regional government concerned
or the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC,
which became the Ministry of Commerce in 2003).
The government has also set requirements for the mode of foreign
entry. Until the mid-1990s, joint ventures were the main mode of entry for
FDI, driven by the PRC’s desire to have local partners learn about
advanced foreign technology. It was only in the late 1990s—in fact, in the
lead-up to the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in January 2002—that the PRC allowed wholly foreign-owned enterprises
to operate in the country, and permitted foreign firms to acquire domestic
firms through new FDI inflows. The government has actively used local
content requirements as a means to foster the backward linkage effects of
FDI, through vertical technology transfers to local suppliers, for example.
The presence of FDI has affected industrial structures in the PRC
through two channels. First, increased competition from foreign compa-
nies—often equipped with superior technology and management—has
driven inefficient local firms out of the market, increasing the degree of
industrial concentration. Second, foreign firms have become the dominant
players in important industries—automobiles, mobile phone production,
chemical products such as detergents and cosmetics, and soft drinks—by
merging with or acquiring leading domestic enterprises. 
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Table 4.3 PRC: Ratio of foreign-invested enterprise sales to industry
sales, 1995–2002 (%)
Industrial sector 1995 1997 1999 2001 2002
Food processing 21.2 23.6 24.0 24.6 25.9
Food production 30.5 35.0 37.7 41.8 40.7
Beverage production 26.2 25.5 27.7 30.6 30.9
Tobacco processing 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5
Textiles 17.9 18.7 21.3 21.8 21.7
Garments & other fiber 
products 50.8 44.9 49.2 46.8 45.5
Leather, furs, & related 
products 54.1 50.1 58.2 54.4 53.2
Timber & straw products 27.3 27.1 32.6 29.6 25.8
Furniture manufacturing 30.7 29.8 42.8 46.6 47.2
Papermaking & paper products 17.0 19.6 28.3 33.0 32.8
Printing & recorded medium 
products 18.3 20.8 31.1 34.6 33.8
Cultural & sporting goods 50.7 49.3 60.6 60.3 60.0
Petroleum processing & coking 1.4 4.1 5.4 9.0 9.9
Chemical materials & products 12.6 14.2 18.8 21.7 22.2
Pharmaceutical products 18.3 20.3 21.8 22.0 21.7
Chemical fibers 12.7 17.5 33.3 21.0 25.4
Rubber products 25.0 23.1 33.2 36.2 39.0
Plastic products 33.0 33.0 42.0 44.0 42.0
Non-metal mineral products 11.4 11.5 16.1 19.3 19.2
Ferrous metals 6.2 4.0 6.5 7.9 7.6
Non-ferrous metals 12.5 11.8 13.2 11.8 12.6
Metal products 26.6 30.0 35.5 36.8 37.2
Ordinary machinery 14.5 16.1 20.7 22.6 24.0
Special purpose equipment 9.0 10.5 14.4 18.9 20.2
Transport equipment 25.2 22.8 29.6 31.5 32.6
Electrical equipment & 
machinery 24.2 27.2 32.2 33.8 33.6
Electronic & telecom-
munications equipment 60.8 62.5 69.5 73.8 73.9
Source: State Statistics Bureau (various years).
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There is now a growing concern that foreign enterprises may soon
dominate all of the country’s industries, and that domestic firms will be
driven out of business. The potentially negative consequences of foreign
acquisitions for domestic brands is illustrated by the case of a leading
domestic brand of toothpaste that is allegedly being ‘killed off’ by the for-
eign MNE that bought it (Box 4.3). In contrast, two acquisitions by
L’Oréal of prominent brands in the skincare industry were apparently not
motivated by the desire to freeze out a competing brand (Box 4.4). 
Merger controls and FDI policy
Since the late 1990s, and especially since the PRC’s accession to the WTO
in early 2002, foreign investors have been keen to merge with or acquire
domestic enterprises. In 2002, its first year as a WTO member, the PRC
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Box 4.3  A case study of local brand 
acquisitions by Unilever and P&G
In early 2002 a bitter row erupted between Unilever, the consumer goods
multinational, and Shanghai Toothpaste Factory (STF), a well-known
domestic company, over a brand agreement for Zhonghua toothpaste.
Zhonghua has been the best-selling toothpaste brand in the PRC for
decades. In 1993, Unilever and STF signed an agreement giving Unilever
the sole right to manufacture, market, and sell the Zhonghua brand in the
PRC. The agreement had an unlimited term, subject to trademark renewal
every 10 years. The key condition for renewal was that the total production
volume in the last year of the agreement should be higher than that in the
first year. 
As the end of the first 10-year period approached, STF told Unilever
that it wanted to end the agreement and take back the brand because it had
‘suffered bad treatment at Unilever’s hand’(China Daily, 16 January 2002).
STF had already taken back another brand of toothpaste leased to
Unilever—Maxam—in 2000. Unilever (China) Limited responded that, far
from shelving the product, it had given it more attention than it deserved.
The company claimed to have spent a considerable sum on developing the
Zhonghua brand—on average 53 percent of its annual advertising and pro-
motion budget in the oral category—and pointed out that production of the
toothpaste had risen to 40,000 tons in 2002 compared with 35,000 tons in
1993. Unilever also said it had invested in new packaging for the Zhonghua
brand and had launched a promotional campaign in August 2001 to boost
sales (China Daily, 16 January 2002). 
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overtook Japan to become the most active M&A market in Asia. Foreign
companies spent $13.9 billion between January and November 2002 on
purchasing domestic firms, up 180 percent over the $4.9 billion spent in
2001 (US–China Business Council 2003). M&As are an important vehi-
cle for foreign investors to gain a strategic position in the domestic mar-
ket; they offer immediate access to distribution channels, customers, and
domestic companies with great potential.29
In response to the rapid emergence of FDI-related M&As, the govern-
ment set up an M&A notification/evaluation system in March 2003, the
first of its kind in the country.30 The purpose of the Interim Provisions 
on Mergers with and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign
Investors is to 
promote and regulate foreign investors’ investment in the PRC and the intro-
duction of advanced technology and management experiences from abroad,
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But STF disagreed. ‘Unilever did not manage to push the sales higher
till almost the end of the first decade. Nevertheless, we are determined to
take back the Zhonghua brand. Zhonghua is a national brand name, with a
long history; we must protect it,’ said a top manager (China Management
Daily, 22 November 2001). In 2003 Unilever and STF finally settled their
dispute, with STF agreeing to renew the contract for the Zhonghua brand
name. One of the conditions of the contract was that Unilever would give
the brand a leading position among its product lines (Southern Daily, 22
September 2004). Some reports suggest that Unilever’s compliance with
this condition, and its recent national campaign to promote the brand, is
part of a damage control effort to change its negative image among domes-
tic consumers of being a ‘domestic brand killer’ (Beijing Modern Com-
merce Daily, 29 September 2004).28
Another multinational, Procter & Gamble (P&G), has also been
accused of ‘freezing’ a local brand. In 1994, P&G set up a joint venture
with Beijing Second Daily Cosmetic Factory to produce and sell Panda
detergent. The Beijing firm was given a 35 percent share of equity in the
joint venture in return for access to its manufacturing facilities and the
Panda brand name. Panda was among the three best-selling detergent
brands in the PRC when the joint venture was launched, but today it is hard
to find it in the shops. In September 2000, the Beijing firm bought back the
brand. But by that time its position in the market had been reduced to
almost nothing whereas P&G’s own brand, Tide, had become a family
name. In six years, production of Panda detergent had dropped from 60,000
to 4,000 tons (China Daily, 16 January 2002).
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improve the utilization of foreign investment, rationalize allocation of
resources, ensure employment, and safeguard fair competition and national
economic security (article 1). 
Article 3 stipulates that as a general rule M&As 
shall not create excessive concentration, eliminate or hinder competition, dis-
turb social and economic order or harm public interests.
The provisions require investors to notify MOFTEC (now the Ministry
of Commerce) and SAIC if any of the following thresholds are met for an
M&A directly involving a domestic enterprise (article 19):32
1 the business turnover of a party to the merger or acquisition in the
domestic market in the current year exceeds CNY1.5 billion (approx-
imately $182 million);
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Box 4.4  A case study of the acquisition of a local brand by L’Oréal
L’Oréal, one of the world’s leading manufacturers of beauty products,
recently reached agreement to take over two leading domestic brands in the
PRC: Mininurse, which it acquired in December 2003, and Yue-Sai, which
it acquired in January 2004. L’Oréal has been exploring the PRC market
since the 1980s. In 1996 it set up a joint venture in Suzhou city in the east-
ern province of Jiangsu to produce cosmetics by Maybelline, the large
American company it had purchased. L’Oréal faces stiff competition in the
PRC from such well-known companies as P&G, Estee Lauder, Avon,
Unilever, and Shiseido. 
Mininurse is among the three leading skincare brands in the PRC. A
mass-market brand based on the quality and affordability of its products,
Mininurse is distributed through some 280,000 outlets found throughout
the PRC. Its market share was 5 percent in 2003. The acquisition was
L’Oréal’s first in the PRC market, and included a manufacturing facility in
Yichang city in Hubei province. Paolo Gasparrini, general manager of
L’Oréal China, said: ‘Mininurse complements L’Oréal’s brand portfolio
perfectly and enables us to move more quickly into the Chinese consumer
skincare market’ (L’Oréal News Release, 11 December 2003). An impor-
tant condition of the agreement was that the creator of Mininurse, Li Zhida,
must not engage in the skincare business in the future.31
L’Oréal’s acquisition of Mininurse was followed a month later by the
acquisition of Yue-Sai Cosmetics, a company founded by Chinese-Ameri-
can TV celebrity Yue-Sai Kan. She had set up a factory in 1992 in Shen-
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2 the foreign investors have merged with or acquired more than 10
domestic enterprises in aggregate in the relevant industry in the PRC
within one year;
3 the market share of a party to the merger or acquisition in the domes-
tic market has reached 20 percent; or
4 the market share of a party to the merger or acquisition in the domes-
tic market will reach 25 percent as a result of the transaction.
The 2003 provisions are the most comprehensive set of M&A regula-
tions in the PRC to date. Although they apply to FDI-related M&As only,
and fall short of international standards from a technical viewpoint, their
establishment nonetheless represents a milestone in antitrust develop-
ment. They are the first set of official rules ever in the PRC to adopt an
antitrust approach to the regulation of M&As.33
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zhen to produce her eponymous brand of cosmetics, promoted as being
specifically designed for Chinese women’s skin. By 1996 Yue-Sai had
become the leading brand in the PRC, with surveys showing that brand
name recognition was especially high among city women (China Daily, 7
August 2001). Yue-Sai had 18 sales offices and over 800 outlets in 240 of
the PRC’s largest cities prior to the transaction. In 2000, the brand
accounted for 26 percent of the color cosmetics market and 17 percent of
the skincare market (China Daily, 30 October 2000). In 2003, Yue-Sai
reported sales of almost 38 million euros ($47 million) (China Daily, Hong
Kong edition, 28 January 2004). But the brand has faced increased compe-
tition since the mid-1990s when foreign competitors realized the PRC’s
market potential and launched large-scale marketing campaigns. 
In 1998, Yue-Sai formed a joint venture with multinational fragrance
and cosmetics firm Coty Inc. to produce up to 60 million units of cosmet-
ics and skincare products per year in Shanghai. Yue-Sai Kan said that she
hoped Coty’s backing would help her brand survive even if other domestic
brands were eventually overwhelmed by foreign giants (China Daily, 26
October 1998).
When L’Oréal purchased Yue-Sai in 2004, Gasparrini affirmed the
company’s intention to look after the valued brand: 
Yue-Sai, a symbolic brand for the Chinese women of today, will naturally
slot into L’Oréal’s portfolio … The brand strengthens the group’s leadership
in make-up and facial skincare. The group’s technological input will enable
Yue-Sai to win new market share (L’Oréal news release, 26 January 2004).
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Report of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce
In early June 2004, after a year-long investigation, SAIC released a report
entitled The Competition-restricting Behavior of Multinational Compa-
nies in China and Countermeasures (SAIC 2004). This report, the first of
its kind in the country, stated that some MNEs commanded obviously
dominant positions in their industries and were using their advantage to
curb competition. It accused several multinationals of attempting to limit
competition through strategies such as predatory pricing, exclusive deal-
ing, tied sales, and M&As. The report specifically mentioned Microsoft
and Eastman Kodak, which both denied any wrongdoing.34
In the case of Kodak, SAIC drew attention to the agreement signed in
1998 between Kodak, the SDRC, the State Economic and Trade Commis-
sion, and MOFTEC under which Kodak undertook to invest a total of $2
billion in acquiring all of the country’s domestic imaging factories, except
those of Lucky Film. On its part, the government agreed not to allow the
establishment of any other joint venture in the imaging sector between
1998 and 2000. In response to the SAIC report, Kodak released a state-
ment saying that the company had never done anything to circumvent the
normal processes of market competition. However, insiders say that the
agreement gave Kodak three golden years to develop its market in the
PRC free from foreign competition. Kodak now has over 50 percent of the
market. Fujifilm, Kodak’s nearest rival, had 48 percent of the market until
1998, but by 2003 its share had dropped to 15 percent as a result of
Kodak’s rapid progress (China Business Weekly, 8 June 2004).
Lu Fu, a professor at the China University of Political Science and
Law, said that the report showed that the PRC urgently needed a complete
set of laws on monopolistic practices and unfair competition (China Busi-
ness Weekly, 8 June 2004). He argued that while continuing to welcome
foreign investment, the PRC should learn more about the potentially neg-
ative effects of the presence of multinational giants and take steps—such
as passing antimonopoly legislation and revising the 1993 Anti Unfair
Competition Law—to prevent them from employing anticompetitive
practices. He is not the only one to be concerned about the potential for
MNEs to abuse their market power in the PRC; some scholars expressed
the view, even before SAIC issued its report, that the new antimonopoly
law should be used to check the monopoly power of transnational corpo-
rations (Wang 2002: 230).35
Given that it specifically targets MNEs and was issued by the sole
enforcer of the 1993 Anti Unfair Competition Law, the SAIC report has
made many multinationals in the PRC uneasy.36 Foreign investors are
deeply concerned about whether they will be treated in the same way as
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domestic players after an antimonopoly law is promulgated.37 It is per-
haps unfortunate that two of the country’s most powerful government
agencies, SAIC and MOFTEC, have each targeted foreign investors
recently, and especially prior to the introduction of antimonopoly legisla-
tion—SAIC with its report and the ministry with merger regulations that
apply exclusively to foreign investors. Given recent developments, it may
take some time, or even some noteworthy cases, for the enforcement
agency of the antimonopoly law (whoever it turns out to be) to convince
the world that the PRC’s competition laws do apply equally and fairly to
all players.
6 COMPETITION, DEVELOPMENT, AND POVERTY
The ‘economic miracle’ of the past two decades has greatly raised the
standard of living in the PRC. According to the World Bank, the propor-
tion of the population living on $1 or less per day declined from 33 per-
cent in 1990 to 16 percent in 2000. This rapid reduction in poverty is
undoubtedly associated with increased economic freedom for individuals
and enterprises, improved flows of trade and resources among regions,
and the introduction of competition to domestic sectors.
However, the process of poverty reduction has been accompanied by
some practices that have limited competition. For instance, due to limited
labor mobility and restrictions on residence inherited from the central
planning period, attracting outside capital has been of critical importance
in developing local economies. The prevalence of regional protectionism
stems directly from local governments’ desire to boost their local
economies and increase the living standards of residents. Like protection-
ism in international markets, this phenomenon can be dealt with primarily
through two approaches: interregional collaboration to abolish trade bar-
riers; and more effective implementation of existing laws prohibiting
regional blockades and protectionism. 
One should note, however, that public awareness of competition issues
is very low in the poorer regions of the country, where law enforcement is
also lacking. Business operators in poor areas may act to maximize their
short-run profit at the expense of the long-term development of the local
economy. Of the three bid-rigging cases SAIC reported to the OECD
Global Forum on Competition in 2001, for example, two concerned
school construction projects, one in Changding county in Fujian province
and the other in Lichuan county in Jiangxi, one of the poorest provinces
in the country (Wang 2001). It is encouraging that SAIC has been target-
ing this type of violation. Local government officials need to understand
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that competition law is enforced not just to ensure fair competition, but
also as an important means to reduce poverty and promote the long-term
development of local economies.
7 CONCLUSION
The PRC has made significant progress over the past decade in setting up
an antitrust system. The passage of the 1993 Anti Unfair Competition Law
and the 1998 Price Law, together with active law enforcement, laid a solid
foundation for creating and maintaining a level playing field for competi-
tion in the PRC. The enforcement effort of SAIC is to be applauded. After
a decade of deliberation and numerous revisions, it appears that the PRC
is finally willing and ready to enact a comprehensive antimonopoly law.
Industrial policies have had direct and significant effects on industrial
structure and the degree of competition in the PRC over the past two
decades. From the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, the government vigor-
ously pursued industrial policies. While the pursuit of such policies has
cooled since the 1997 financial crisis, and especially since the PRC
acceded to the WTO in 2002, industrial policies remain an important pol-
icy instrument for the government, particularly in major sectors such as
airlines and automotives, as recent M&A activity illustrates. The long
delay in passing an antimonopoly law is related to the government’s fear
that the business conglomerates it has nurtured through its targeted indus-
trial policies may be adversely affected by such legislation.
Another major driving force in antitrust development over the past two
decades has been inward FDI, which has had a huge impact on industrial
structure, firm conduct, and the degree of competition in the PRC. On the
one hand, FDI has contributed to market fragmentation as regional gov-
ernments competed to attract foreign capital and technology, causing
duplication of investments in many sectors. Local governments have even
erected regional trade barriers to protect foreign-invested enterprises in
their regions. On the other hand, the presence of foreign enterprises has
seen less-efficient local enterprises driven out of business, leading to a
rapid increase in the level of industrial concentration. Moreover, MNEs
have been actively merging with or acquiring local firms, to get quick
access to their distribution channels, customer base, and so on. FDI-
related M&As have been particularly common since the PRC acceded to
the WTO in 2002, and began to allow foreign investors to combine with
domestic enterprises in early 2003. 
The presence of foreign enterprises prompted the PRC to establish a
merger control regime, albeit applying to FDI-related transactions only.
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The 2003 Interim Provisions on M&As marked a milestone in the devel-
opment of an antitrust system in the PRC. One can predict that the inter-
play of FDI policy and competition policy, and the accompanying
interaction among foreign and domestic firms, will continue to be a pri-
mary factor shaping industrial structure, firm conduct, and performance in
the PRC for years to come.
With a general antimonopoly law likely to be in place within the next
two years, the PRC will soon have a fairly complete set of competition
laws. Law enforcement will then be the biggest challenge facing the coun-
try. One difficult task will be to tackle the administrative monopolies
inherited from the old central planning system, which have proven to be
extremely resilient throughout the entire economic reform era. As illus-
trated by the case studies in this chapter, sectoral monopolies and regional
protectionism will continue to pose enforcement problems for the new
competition agency.38 With regard to regional blockades, the recent for-
mation of the Pan Pearl River Delta alliance with the sole goal of break-
ing down regional trade and investment barriers is an encouraging
development. There is good reason to expect that similar common markets
will be formed among other regional economies as interregional competi-
tion intensifies further, and as regional governments realize the full extent
of the damage caused by interregional trade wars.
Another major challenge for the PRC will be to deal with the potential
conflicts between industrial policy and competition policy. Although
industrial policies will become less important as the PRC fulfills its WTO
obligations in the years to come, they remain deeply rooted in government
regulations. The 2003 M&A provisions, for instance, take the clear stand
that competition policy is secondary to industrial policy.39 The industrial
policy mentality may also influence the enforcement of competition laws
in the PRC, including the antimonopoly law even if it does not explicitly
incorporate industrial policy concepts. In addition, the recent SAIC report
has created great concern among foreign investors. It will be interesting to
see how the government balances fair competition on the one hand against
protection of domestic enterprises on the other.
For all of the above reasons, it is crucial for the PRC to set up a pow-
erful and independent competition authority. The competition authority
should have the power and capability to combat administrative monopo-
lies, and should therefore not be affiliated to any existing government
ministry or agency. Ideally it would be placed directly under the State
Council to guarantee that it has the real authority to challenge administra-
tive monopolies.40
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In addition, to ensure that competition law is enforced without inter-
ference from other government policies with potentially conflicting objec-
tives, the competition authority should be separated from those agencies
that have had responsibility for implementing the country’s industrial and
FDI policies in the past. There needs to be a clear recognition that having
the will and intent to implement competition rules fairly and equally is a
different matter from being seen to apply the rules fairly and equally.
Because of such factors as asymmetric information, the competition
authority’s methods of dealing with given cases will never be perfectly
observable to outsiders. If in addition the agency is charged with a dual
role that requires it to implement potentially conflicting policies, its inde-
pendence may be compromised in the public mind.41 While it may be
costly to set up a new competition agency, the PRC’s policy-makers
should be aware that competition laws are the fundamental rules of the
game for a market economy and that the benefits of investing in institu-
tion building should not be underestimated.
Other important factors for an effective antitrust system include capac-
ity building, competition advocacy, and development of a culture of fair
competition. Overall, the PRC has much to learn from the experiences of
other countries, particularly those in East Asia.42 Perhaps the most valu-
able lesson concerns the importance of a truly independent competition
authority. In Japan, for instance, the conflict between the Fair Trade Com-
mission, which administrates competition policy, and the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (now the Ministry of Economy, Trade
and Industry), which implements industrial policy, has impeded the
enforcement of competition law (Sanekata and Wilks 1996). The PRC
should fully explore its late-mover advantage in competition policy devel-
opment and should not repeat the mistakes other countries have made,
particularly in institutional design.
NOTES
1 An English version of the law can be found at <www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/
China.html>.
2 It is worth noting that the Anti Unfair Competition Law does not prohibit
price cartels (price fixing) in general, even though almost all of the competi-
tion laws of other countries consider such cartels to be per se illegal. This
omission was fixed in the 1998 Price Law. 
3 The People’s Courts also play a role in enforcing the law.
4 The tendency of firms to rely heavily on price competition, as opposed to
non-price competition (advertising, quality, research and development, serv-
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ice), may account for the seemingly large number of predatory pricing cases
in the PRC compared with other countries (see, for example, Xie 2001).
5 This approach is not confined to competition law; reliance on administrative
channels is also common in other areas of law enforcement, such as the
enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
6 Two additional laws that support national competition legislation, but that are
not discussed in detail in this chapter, are the Law of the People’s Republic
of China for Protecting Consumers’ Rights and Interests, promulgated in
1993, and the Public Tendering Law of the People’s Republic of China,
enacted in 1999. The latter law covers bid rigging in more detail than the 1993
Anti Unfair Competition Law.
7 The law also prohibits conduct such as spreading rumors about price hikes,
attracting business through deceptive pricing, and so on.
8 The Law of the People’s Republic of China on International Trade, promul-
gated in 1994 and revised in April 2004, prohibits predatory pricing and bid
rigging in the context of international trade (articles 32 and 33). 
9 Exactly why a separate enforcement agency was chosen for the Price Law,
rather than getting the SAIC to do the job, is unknown.
10 For instance, the agencies set a minimum charge on a one-week trip to Thai-
land at CNY3,900, compared with as low as CNY2,800 before the agreement
was reached. See Kong (2001: 188–9) for more details.
11 On 20 January 2000, the Chinese Automobile Industry Association publicized
a decision by 10 domestic automobile manufacturers not to fight a price war.
However, because they did this more discretely than the color TV manufac-
turers, the case did not receive as much media attention (China Daily, 3
August 2000). 
12 Under the Price Law and the Anti Unfair Competition Law, manufacturers
who manipulate market prices can be fined CNY30,000–300,000 ($3,600–
36,000), and any illegal income can be confiscated. 
13 See ‘Cooperation started among the nine domestic color TV producers’ at
<http://www1.people.com.cn/GB/channel3/22/20000609/97046.html> [in
Chinese].
14 See Li Jialu, ‘Price cutting behavior since the color TV summit’ at <http://
www1.people.com.cn/GB/channel3/22/20000809/180077.html> [in Chi-
nese]. 
15 Jung and Hao (2003) provide a comprehensive evaluation of the draft anti-
monopoly law, especially from a legal perspective.
16 See Becker (1968) and Posner (1977). The treble damage system of US
antitrust law, for instance, is consistent with these basic economic principles.
17 The administrative surcharges imposed under Japan’s Antimonopoly Act used
to be based on the idea of ‘confiscation of illegal gains.’ Japan is currently
planning to change this arrangement to one that imposes multiple damages.
See Lin (2005) and Fair Trade Commission of Japan (2004) for further
details.
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18 Jiang (2002a: Table 1) provides a detailed description of the various measures
included in the industrial policy framework.
19 See also Jiang (1996) for a comprehensive study of the PRC’s industrial poli-
cies from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, from both a theoretical and practi-
cal perspective. 
20 In 1987, it was made clear at the 13th Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party that small SOEs could be sold to collectives and individuals. In 1994,
the government began to conduct mergers of large and medium-sized enter-
prises in 100 pilot cities.
21 These industries included electricity generation, coal mining, automobiles,
electronics, iron and steel, machinery, chemicals, construction materials,
transport, aerospace, and pharmaceuticals. See Nolan (2001) for a detailed
study. 
22 In the mid-1990s, as part of a reform of the country’s innovation system,
many R&D centers affiliated with ministries or other government agencies
were transferred to members of the national team. The goal was to enhance
their R&D capacity as well as to overcome the entrenched problem of
research projects not being motivated by the actual needs of the market sim-
ply because so many R&D centers were not linked to real business entities. 
23 Some scholars say that one important reason for the long delay in introduc-
ing antitrust legislation is competition among the present enforcement agen-
cies—SAIC, the SDRC, and the Ministry of Commerce (which took over the
task of drafting the antimonopoly law in 2003)—to gain the power to enforce
the general antimonopoly law (Neumann and Guo 2003).
24 Watson, Findlay, and Du (1989) cite the ‘wool war’ and the ‘silk war’ of the
mid-1980s as examples of local governments trying to keep raw materials
within the locality in order to favor local manufacturers. 
25 Because PRC auto-makers tend to be overstaffed and produce on a small
scale, a few years ago the prices of domestically produced cars were two to
three times higher than the world average. Large domestic manufacturers
relied on import tariffs of 80–100 percent to maintain their profitability. How-
ever, import tariffs have been declining since the PRC’s accession to the
WTO in early 2002.
26 The nine provinces were Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, Guangdong, Hainan,
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.
The 11 regions together account for 47 percent of the economy and more than
half of foreign trade.
27 The catalog has been revised several times—most recently in 2002 after the
PRC entered the WTO—becoming increasingly less restrictive. According to
the 2002 version, prohibited industries include certain financial services, air
transportation, media, and electricity transmission.
28 In addition to Zhonghua and Maxam, Unilever acquired four other local
brands in the PRC during the 1990s in the fields of detergent, tea production,
and ice cream. Most have either struggled or disappeared (Beijing Modern
Commerce Daily, 29 September 2004).
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29 In 2001, for example, Emerson took over Avansys, the entire electronic wing
of Huawei Technologies, a leading telecommunications supplier in the PRC,
for $750 million in cash, making it the largest M&A deal between a private
domestic company and a foreign investor to date. In the banking sector, Hong
Kong and Shanghai Bank spent $62 million to purchase an 8 percent stake in
Shanghai Bank in January 2002, thus becoming the first foreign bank to own
a stake in a state-owned domestic bank (Global M&A Research Center 2003).
30 The English version of the regulations can be found at <http://bizchina.china
daily.com.cn/guide/law/law05.htm>.
31 See China Youth Daily, 12 December 2003. A similar condition was 
contained in the agreement with Yue-Sai Kan; see Yangcheng Wuanbao
[Yangcheng Evening Paper], 10 February 2004. 
32 A different set of thresholds applies to off-shore M&As that affect domestic
markets. 
33 According to private sources, the Ministry of Commerce has received and
approved many merger applications from foreign investors since the regula-
tions were issued, but has not challenged any of them. 
34 China Daily, Hong Kong edition, 18 June 2004. Microsoft stated that the
company’s conduct in the PRC was in line with PRC laws and regulations
(China Daily, 2 June 2004).
35 Other scholars are less worried about the presence of foreign companies in
the PRC, arguing that the dominant market share of foreign firms as a whole,
rather than of a single firm, does not necessarily imply monopoly in PRC
markets (see, for example, Jiang 2002b). Also, according to SAIC data, less
than 10 percent of the cases dealt with by SAIC have involved foreign firms.
36 Abbott B. ‘Tad’ Lipsky, a partner with Latham & Watkins LLP in Washing-
ton DC, said that ‘there are going to be a lot of foreign investors losing sleep
until economic and procedural rationality and proportional remedy are estab-
lished as the organizing principles of Chinese antitrust’ (Global Competition
Review, 2 July 2004, <www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/news_print.
cfm?item_id=1825>).
37 An anonymous official of the National People’s Congress recently said that
the PRC’s antimonopoly law would ‘definitely treat all enterprises equally’
(China Daily, 2 June 2004).
38 One major difficulty for SAIC in enforcing the 1993 Anti Unfair Competition
Law has been interference from local governments, which on many occasions
have tried to prevent its staff from investigating firms in their localities (SAIC
2002).
39 Lin (2004) argues that the incorporation of competition provisions in the
2003 M&A provisions places an additional constraint on the set of permissi-
ble mergers within the traditional industrial policy framework. Under the reg-
ulations, even mergers that would enhance competition are not allowed if
they would violate industrial policy as stipulated in the Catalog Guiding For-
eign Investment in Industry (MOFTEC 2003).
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40 However, it has been reported that in the latest draft of the antimonopoly law,
submitted to the State Council in secrecy, the article on setting up an inde-
pendent competition authority directly under the State Council has been
dropped. It is not clear whether SAIC, the Ministry of Commerce, or some
other agency will be responsible for enforcing the antimonopoly law (China
Daily 29 June 2004, <www.chinadaily.com.cn/English/doc/2004-06/29/
content_343701.htm>).
41 See Chen and Lin (2002) for a discussion of the informational problem asso-
ciated with the dual role in the context of competition policy in Hong Kong,
China’s telecommunications industry.
42 For a discussion of the implications of East Asian experiences for competi-
tion policy in the PRC, see Lin (2005).
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Appendix A4.1 PRC: Table of contents of the draft antimonopoly law,
February 2002a
Chapter 1 General provisions
Article 1 Objectives 
Article 2 Area of application 
Article 3 Monopolies
Article 4 Definition of ‘business operator’ and ‘specific market’
Article 5 Responsibilities of government 
Article 6 Enforcement organs
Article 7 Social supervision
Chapter 2 Prohibition on monopoly agreements
Article 8 Prohibition on monopoly agreements
Article 9 Application for exemption
Article 10 Submission of agreements 
Article 11 Approval of agreements
Article 12 Modification or revocation of agreement approvals 
Article 13 Publication of approvals
Chapter 3 Prohibition on abuse of dominant market position
Article 14 Prohibition on abuse of dominant market position
Article 15 Dominant market position
Article 16 Presumption of dominant market position
Article 17 Prohibition on setting monopolistic prices
Article 18 Prohibition on predatory pricing
Article 19 Prohibition on discriminatory treatment
Article 20 Prohibition on refusal to deal
Article 21 Prohibition on forced transactions
Article 22 Prohibition on tied sales or imposition of unreasonable
transaction terms
Article 23 Prohibition on exclusive dealing
Article 24 Prohibition on resale price maintenance
Chapter 4 Control of enterprise mergers and acquisitions 
(concentration)
Article 25 Definition of enterprise mergers and acquisitions
(concentration)
Article 26 Application for enterprise mergers and acquisitions
(concentration)
Article 27 Content of applications
Article 28 Approval of applications
Article 29 Conditions for approval
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Article 30 Special approval 
Article 31 Modification or revocation of approval
Chapter 5 Prohibition on administrative monopolies
Article 32 Forced transactions
Article 33 Regional monopolies
Article 34 Sector and industry monopolies
Article 35 Forced joint limitations on competition
Article 36 Regional and sectoral regulations that limit competition
Chapter 6 Antimonopoly authority
Article 37 Investigation and prosecution
Article 38 Responsibilities
Article 39 Investigative powers
Article 40 Carrying out duties lawfully
Article 41 Administrative advice
Article 42 Announcement of results
Article 43 Obligations
Chapter 7 Legal liability
Article 44 Penalty for agreement that limits competition
Article 45 Penalty for abuse of a dominant market position
Article 46 Penalty for unauthorized merger or acquisition
(concentration)
Article 47 Penalty for regional blockade
Article 48 Penalty for forced transaction, regional monopoly, sector
monopoly, forced joint activity, etc.
Article 49 Victim’s right to take legal action
Article 50 Obligation to compensate
Article 51 Penalty for activities of investigated person
Article 52 Enforcement of the decision
Article 53 Rights of the parties concerned
Article 54 Liability for failure to fulfill responsibility to maintain
confidentiality
Article 55 Responsibilities of public servants
Chapter 8 Supplementary articles
Article 56 Conduct relating to the exercise of intellectual property rights
Article 57 Issuance of detailed rules and guidelines
Article 58 Date of effectiveness
a Translated from the original by the author.
108 Competition Policy and Development in Asia
Comp13  17/5/05  2:46 PM  Page 108
